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Temporal steering is a form of temporal correlation between the initial and final state of a quan-
tum system. It is a temporal analogue of the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (spatial) steering.
We demonstrate, by measuring the photon polarization, that temporal steering allows two parties
to verify if they have been interacting with the same particle, even if they have no information
about what happened with the particle in between the measurements. This is the first experimen-
tal study of temporal steering. We also performed experimental tests, based on the violation of
temporal steering inequalities, of the security of two quantum key distribution protocols against
individual attacks. Thus, these results can lead to applications for secure quantum communications
and quantum engineering.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Mn, 42.50.Dv
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) steering refers to
strong nonclassical nonlocal bipartite correlations. It
was first described by Schro¨dinger [1] as a generaliza-
tion of the EPR paradox [2]. The recent celebration
of the 80 years of steering and the EPR paradox [3]
showed that our understanding of this phenomenon is
now much deeper, but still very limited. Steering differs
from quantum entanglement [4] and Bell nonlocality [5–
7], as not every entangled state manifests steering and
not every state that manifests steering violates Bell’s in-
equality [8]. In other words, steerable states are a sub-
set of entangled states and a superset of Bell nonlocal
states. Analogously to Bell nonlocality, steering can be
detected independently of other nonclassical correlations
by simple inequalities [8–10] that can include as little
as two measurements with two outcomes for Alice and
a set of four possible states for Bob [9]. Such inequali-
ties were tested in several experiments [10–17], including
a recent loophole-free experiment [18]. Steering can be
interpreted as a correlation between two systems (mea-
suring devices), where only one of them is trusted. This
property shows an operational meaning of steering and
indicates its potential applications in quantum cryptog-
raphy and quantum communication, e.g., for entangle-
ment distribution [8, 19]. Steering-based protocols can
provide secure communications even when only one party
trusts its devices. Such protocols are easier to imple-
ment than completely-device-independent protocols [20],
but are more secure than standard protocols requiring
mutual trust between the communicating parties.
Temporal steering [21] (TS), analogously to EPR steer-
ing, is observed when Alice can steer Bob’s state into
one of two orthogonal states by properly choosing her
measured observable. Despite this similarity, the impli-
cations of these temporal and spatial phenomena are fun-
damentally different. To detect TS [21], Alice and Bob
perform consecutive measurements (using a random se-
quence of mutually-unbiased bases known only to them)
on the same system to test temporal correlations between
its initial and final states. Breaking the temporal steer-
ing inequality, given in Ref. [21], implies that no unau-
thorised party can gather full information about the final
quantum state. In other words, there was no quantum
collapse and the observed correlations are stronger than
any correlations between the initial state and its classi-
cal copy prepared by measuring and resending the ini-
tial state. Such strong temporal correlations must have
a quantum origin. Their stronger form asserts that no
third party can gather more information about the orig-
inal state than Bob. In this case, Alice and Bob witness
temporal correlations of a unique strength, which prove
that they interact with the original quantum system and
not with one of its quantum copies. This unique rela-
tion between the past and the future is referred to here
as monogamous quantum causality. Here, Alice mostly
steers the future state of Bob and no other system can
be steered with the same strength. This regime is espe-
cially interesting for quantum cryptography, because it
allows performing secure quantum key distribution pro-
tocols over a quantum channel, which is not fully char-
acterised (trusted).
In contrast with EPR steering [10–18, 22–30], TS has
not yet been investigated experimentally. This article
reports, to our knowledge, the first experimental demon-
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2stration of TS. We verify, in a quantum linear-optical ex-
periment, the relation between TS and two quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocols based on mutually unbi-
ased bases (MUB). Specifically, we apply temporal steer-
ing for experimental testing the security of the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 protocol (BB84) [31] and the six-state
1998 protocol by Bruss (B98) [32] against individual at-
tacks. As discussed theoretically in Ref. [33], the uncon-
ditional security of these protocols [34–36] (even against
individual attacks) implies the existence of a kind of
monogamous temporal correlations. The first experimen-
tal test of this temporal steering monogamy is reported
here.
TS is understood as the ability of Alice to prepare a
quantum object in a quantum state that after travelling,
for a period of time through a damping channel, to Bob
will manifest strong temporal correlations between its ini-
tial and final states. These correlations tell us how strong
is the influence of Alice’s choice of observable on Bob’s
results. The channel can erase partially or completely Al-
ice’s influence. This decoherence process will take some
time. Thus, TS is an appropriate name for this effect. It
was shown [21] that these temporal correlations are re-
lated to the one-way security bound in BB84. Therefore,
this new kind of steering, similarly as the standard EPR
steering, can be responsible for secure (one-way) quan-
tum communications. However, Ref. [21] did not explain
the origins of this relation between TS and QKD. In a
certain sense, this TS is a kind of one-way (or asym-
metric) (temporal) steering because of the time arrow.
For spatial steering, one could consider one-way (spatial)
steering as well as two-way (spatial) steering, where the
roles of Alice and Bob are interchanged. For TS this
can be done only for a unitary (reversible) evolution of
a given steered system. Steering is, by definition, asym-
metric, as corresponding to one-side device-independent
entanglement detection. Thus, in steering one assumes
that only one side is performing faithful measurements.
This is in contrast with entanglement, where both par-
ties are trusted, as well as Bell’s nonlocality, where both
parties are untrusted.
Experimental temporal steering.— In our experiment,
Alice with probability P (a|Ai) prepares qubits by rotat-
ing |H〉 (a horizontally-polarised photon) to one of the
six eigenstates of the Pauli operators. This is done by
the consecutive use of half- (H) and quarter-wave (Q)
plates as shown in Fig. 1. To implement BB84, Alice
sends eigenstates of only the σ1 and σ2 operators. She
implements B98 by including also σ3. This method of
state preparation is equivalent to performing a projec-
tive nondestructive measurement Ai by separating states
of a = +1 and a = −1 with a polarising beam split-
ter (an equivalent of the Stern-Gerlach experiment [37]),
and detecting their presence in one of its paths. A pho-
ton with probability P (+1|Ai) chooses the path desig-
nated for a = +1 and, with probability P (−1|Ai), the
path for a = −1. However, the latter approach would
be much more difficult to implement because it would
require a nondemolition photon-presence detection (see,
e.g., Ref. [38]). In the former approach, we assume that
the state preparation governed by the probability dis-
tribution P (a|A) is equivalent to Alice’s nondestructive
equiprobable measurements of Ai = σi for i = 1, 2, 3,
where the outcomes of the measurement Ai are a = ±1
and appear with the probability P (a|Ai) = 1/2. The
final measurement does not have to be nondestructive,
because this is the final step of the measurement. This
is sufficient to check if the channel can partially or com-
pletely erase Alice’s influence on the state detected by
Bob, hence to demonstrate TS without applying a quan-
tum nondemolition measurement.
A nontrivial case of TS requires a nonunitary dynam-
ics. We implement such evolution with two channels
labelled by λ. To show this evolution, we analyze the
TS parameters SN ≡
∑N
i=1E
[
〈Bi,tB〉2Ai,tA
]
correspond-
ing to the left-hand-side of the TS inequality of Chen
et al. [21] (see also Ref. [33]) and a measure of TS, i.e.,
the so-called TS weight wt,N , as defined in Refs. [33, 39].
The TS inequality is satisfied for all classical states and
it reads
SN ≡
N∑
i=1
E
[
〈Bi,tB〉2Ai,tA
]
≤ 1. (1)
The technical definition of wt,N is rather complex,
thus we present it in the Methods. However, this
quantity measures the amount of the genuine tempo-
ral steering correlations between Alice and Bob, max-
imised over the possible Bob’s measurements. The
TS parameter SN depends on the number N = 2, 3
of unbiased measurements Bi ≡ σi performed by
Bob. This corresponds to a sum over the measure-
ments of the expectation values E
[
〈Bi,tB〉2Ai,tA
]
≡∑
a=±1 P (a|Ai,tA) 〈Bi,tB〉2a|Ai,tA , where Bob’s outcomes
are related to the state projection performed by Alice, as
〈Bi,tB〉a|Ai,tA ≡
∑
b=±1 b P (b|Ai,tA = a,Bi,tB). The pa-
rameter N represents the number of the MUB used by
Bob to analyze the received qubit. For only one chan-
nel (corresponding to a simple unitary evolution of an
isolated photon), the TS parameters and the TS weight
would not exhibit an interesting behaviour beyond sim-
ple oscillations. In the extreme case, when the output
state of a channel is always the same, independent of the
input state, Alice’s influence on the state detected by
Bob is completely erased. However, for typical imperfect
channels, this Alice’s influence is only partially lost and,
in the context of QKD, this loss of information can be
attributed to eavesdropping.
For both BB84 and B98 there exists a minimal value
of the average quantum bit error rate (QBER) rN in the
raw key for which the respective protocol is no longer
3secure. For individual qubit attacks these values are r2 =
1
2 (1− 1√2 ) for BB84 (N = 2) and r3 = 16 for B98 (N = 3).
These values correspond to the minimal amount of noise
introduced by an eavesdropper equipped with a quantum
cloning machine optimised to copy the states prepared
by Alice in a relevant protocol. The security of these
QKD protocols is naturally related to optimal quantum
cloning and it was studied in various works (see, e.g.,
Refs. [36, 40–43] and references therein). It was recently
shown that the TS parameter SN depends on the average
QBER rN or the average fidelity FN = 1 − rN of the
states received by Bob[33]. This was done by expressing
the steering parameter SN in terms of the fidelity Fi,a of
the particular states prepared in a QKD protocol by Alice
with respect to the states measured by Bob, i.e., SN ≡
1
2
∑N
i=1
∑
a=±1(2Fi,a−1)2. The derived relation between
temporal steering and security of QKD[33] SN > N(1−
2rN )
2 asserts that QBERN < rN . Thus, the minimal
violation of this security condition indicates the maximal
values of SN = N(1− 2rN )2 for which the relevant QKD
protocols are insecure.
In our experiment, λ can have two values 0 and 1.
For λ = 0, a photon of polarisation V is erased, with
probability p0 = 1 − τ , with a filter of transmittance τ .
For λ = 1, with probability p1 = 1 − p0, the photon is
passed to Bob in the state R(θ)|a|A〉. The polarisation
is rotated by an angle θ, i.e., it is transformed by the
operator R(θ) = 1 cos θ + iσ2 sin θ, where 1 is the two-
dimensional identity operator. Each time a photon is
erased by the filter, Bob counts one photon received in
state R(θ)|H〉. We can set the values of p0 and p1 by
setting the transmission rate τ , while we set the rotation
angle θ by inserting two half-wave plates into the beam
(see Fig. 1). We set in the experiment τ and θ in a way
that Bob receives states which can be expressed as
ρˆa|Ai(tB) = R(4tB)
(
1− ρ11e−tB ρ01e−
tB
2
ρ10e
− tB2 ρ11e−tB
)
R†(4tB),
(2)
where ρ00 ≡ 〈+1, A3|ρˆa|Ai(tA)| + 1, A3〉, ρ01 = ρ∗10 ≡
〈+1, A3|ρˆa|Ai(tA)| − 1, A3〉, ρ11 ≡ 〈−1, A3|ρˆa|Ai(tA)| −
1, A3〉, and ρˆa|Ai(tA) = |a,Ai〉〈a,Ai|. The time tB , be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s measurements, is measured in
units of the inverse of the damping constant γ. In our
experiment, we set γ = 1/t, where t = 50 ns is the time
needed for a photon to make one loop in the setup. The
time tB = −t log τ is set by changing the value of τ . The
states in Eq. (2) correspond (up to a unitary rotation) to
the solution of a simple relaxation [44] model that pro-
vides an example of nonunitary dynamics.
Finally, Bob performs polarisation analysis with a
setup consisting of a set of a half- and quarter-wave
plates, a polarising beam splitter (PBS), and a single-
photon counting module (SPCM). This allows him to
project the incoming photons on each of the |b, B〉
states. Bob receives photons arriving from both chan-
nels λ. As a result of Bob performing his projec-
tions on each of the six states |b, Bj〉, we obtain the
probability distribution P (a, b|Ai, Bj) (we know what
state has been sent by Alice) that holds the same in-
formation as the assemblage {ρa|Ai}a,i. This is be-
cause P (b|Ai = a,Bj) = tr(|b, Bj〉〈b, Bj |ρa|Ai). How-
ever, in the context of the QKD protocols we are inter-
ested only in the compatible bases (i = j), therefore,
P (b|Ai = a,Bj) = tr(|b, Bj〉〈b, Bj |ρa|Ai)δi,j , where δi,j is
the Kronecker delta.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show that our experimental data are
in good agreement with the expected results. However,
the correspondence is not perfect due to experimental im-
perfections. From these measured results we calculated
the TS parameters SN [21, 33] and the corresponding TS
weights wt,N [33, 39]. The TS inequality [see Fig. 2] pro-
vides a sufficient condition for the existence of TS and a
security threshold for the MUB protocols with symmet-
ric noise against individual attacks. In our experiment
this threshold for SN is usable only for BB84 (N = 2)
at a specific time tB = npi/2, where n = 0, 1, 2. In
these cases, BB84 is secure against individual attacks if
the TS inequality is violated, i.e., S2 > 1. However, it is
not so for B98, where the protocol can be insecure even if
S3 > 1. In B98, we deal with the asymmetric dynamics of
the channel (i.e., a relaxation process to one of the eigen-
states of the Pauli operators); however, we can assess the
security using the S3 > 4/3 condition. The increase for
tBγ > 0.8 of the S2 parameter with respect to the theo-
retical curve, excluding the R(4tB) rotation around the
y direction, is caused by interchanging the noise between
the z and x directions. The TS weight, as shown in Fig. 3,
which is insensitive to rotations, proves or disproves the
existence of TS. Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, it is clear that
the relation between the TS inequality and the TS weight
is not trivial. The TS weight implicitly includes all possi-
ble TS inequalities, so it detects steering better than the
TS inequality. In Fig. 3, the value wt,N = 0, implies the
insecurity of the relevant QKD protocol.
DISCUSSION
We note that a well-known technique for analysing the
security in QKD is to introduce virtual entanglement
by conceptually replacing state preparation with mea-
surements on an entangled source [45]. Thus, one could
think that the standard steering inequalities applied to
the virtual entangled source can be used to determine
the security requirements on the preparation and mea-
surement correlations. Nevertheless, the described idea
corresponds to analysing the security in QKD via spatial
or spatio-temporal steering. In contrast with this idea,
we analysed the security in QKD via purely temporal
steering by replacing the two-qubit measurements with
4measurements on a single qubit, followed by the evolu-
tion under some noisy quantum channel.
In optical fibres one deals with several types of noise
and losses which limit the range of the applicability of
QKD. These problems are the polarization-dependent
losses, geometric phase, birefringence, and polariza-
tion mode dispersion (see Ref. [36]). In our experi-
ment, we implemented a combination of the polarization-
dependent losses and polarization rotation [see Eq. (2)].
The polarization-dependent losses can be significant in
components like phase modulators and open a way for at-
tacking QKD protocols, e.g., the two-state protocol [46]
by changing nonorthogonal states into orthogonal ones
[47]. However, the state-dependent losses are usually
not that important in optical fibres. The polarization
rotation could be attributed to the geometric phase (a
special case of the Berry phase [48]) that accumulates,
e.g., when polarised photons are transmitted through fi-
bre loops. Alternatively, this polarization rotation can be
caused by polarization-dependent dispersion due to the
stress applied to optical fibres. The latter effect occurs
in the polarization controllers used in our setup shown in
Fig. 1.
Our analysis remains unchanged after including such
additional state-independent losses like lossy quantum
channels or imperfect detectors. State-dependent losses
may cause some basis states to be transmitted more often
than others. Thus, the security threshold should be re-
vised by replacing the previously used rN with its optimal
value found for the new asymmetric qubit distribution.
This value can be calculated efficiently by optimising the
the average single-copy fidelity F = 1− rN of 1→2 qubit
cloners [49].
CONCLUSION
We experimentally demonstrated the possibility of
temporal quantum steering with photon polarizations in
a linear-optical setup. We applied TS for testing the
security of two popular quantum-key distribution proto-
cols (i.e., BB84 and B98), which are based on mutually-
unbiased bases. We have measured the evolution of the
TS weight [33, 39] and TS parameters corresponding to
the violations of the TS inequalities of Chen et al. [21]. To
our knowledge, this is the first experimental determina-
tion of the TS weight. Note that this TS weight is closely
related to spatial steerable weights [50, 51], which have
not been measured yet. Our experimental tests demon-
strate the monogamy of TS and, thus, the security of
the analysed cryptographic protocols against individual
attacks. We believe that these first experimental demon-
strations of TS can lead to useful applications in secure
quantum communication.
METHODS
Pauli operators in the photon-polarisation ba-
sis. We apply the standard eigenstate expansions of the
Pauli operators, which read as: σ1 = |+〉〈+| − |−〉〈−|,
σ2 = |L〉〈L| − |R〉〈R|, and σ3 = |H〉〈H| − |V 〉〈V |, where
| − 1, A1〉 ≡ |−〉 = (|H〉 − |V 〉)/
√
2, | + 1, A1〉 ≡ |+〉 =
(|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2, | − 1, A2〉 ≡ |R〉 = (|H〉 − i|V 〉)/
√
2,
| + 1, A2〉 ≡ |L〉 = (|H〉 + i|V 〉)/
√
2, | − 1, A3〉 ≡ |V 〉,
and | + 1, A3〉 ≡ |H〉. These eigenstates of the Pauli
operators are, respectively: the antidiagonal, diagonal,
right-circular, left-circular, vertical, and horizontal
polarization states.
Experimental setup. Alice’s setup, as shown in Fig. 1
(in the main article) consists of QA and HA that allow her
to set any of the |a,A〉 states. The polarisation modes
are flipped V ↔ H by H1, then separated by BD1 and
H-polarised photons are attenuated by the NDF. Next,
the polarisation modes are recombined by first flipping
back the polarisation modes V ↔ H by H2 and then
joining the beams at BD2. The channel performs the op-
eration R(θ) with wave plates H3 and H4. Each of these
two plates implements the transformation that flips the
polarisation direction along their optical axes. It can be
readily shown that the two transformations constitute
a rotation by angle θ = 2δ, where δ denotes the angle
between the optical axes of the two wave plates. The
polarisation controllers are used to stabilise the output
polarisation. To satisfy the consistency conditions (see
Ref. [33]) we assume that all the photons sent by Alice
reach Bob, i.e., we interpret all the physical photon losses
due to the imperfections of the photon counting process
as the result of state preparation and not as the true
transmission losses. However, the photons in the state
R(4tB)|V 〉, which are lost due to the NDF of transmit-
tance τ , are added to the final counts, i.e., the NDF is
interpreted as a part of Bob’s detection setup.
Bob’s setup consists of QB and HB followed by a
PBS and SPCM (Perkin-Elmer). This setup allows to
project the incoming photons onto every of the states
|b, B〉. The beam splitter (BS) is used to verify if Alice
has indeed prepared photons in the desired state |a,A〉
before sending them through the channel. However, the
purity of states sent by Alice is p ≈ 96%, i.e., Bob’s
results are effectively scaled by the shrinking factor
s =
√
2p− 1 ≈ 96%. Moreover, the BS rotates the
photons travelling to Bob by circa 7◦ around the z axis
with respect to the photons travelling to Alice. We take
these factors into account in the presented theoretical
curves, unless stated otherwise. The time delay, between
the photons send via the delay loop and reflected to Bob,
directly allows to analyse both the input and output
states using the same detection setup. Single photons
are generated using a heralded single-photon source.
5This source uses a type-I spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) process occurring in a 1 mm thick
BBO crystal pumped by the third harmonics (355 nm)
of a Nd-YAG laser (300 mW) with a repetition rate of
2500 Hz and a pulse width of 6.5 nm. The signal photon
generated in the SPDC process powers the experiment,
while the idler is used for triggering. We registered
circa 2000 such photon pairs per second. The triggering
allows us to post-select only on valid detection events
(by eliminating detector dark counts) and to gate the
signal detection corresponding to the direct reflection
on the beam splitter BS shown in Fig. 1 of the article
(no runs in the loop) from one, or possibly more runs,
in the fibre loop. Our source delivers signal photons
with a polarization-state purity of about 96% and a
beam transversal profile corresponding to the TEM00
mode filtered by single-mode fibers. The generation rate
was adjusted so that the probability of more than one
photon impinging on the detector was limited to about
5%.
Experimental losses. The experimental data collected
by Bob are shown in Fig. 4. The setup implements the
intended transformations with an average fidelity of circa
95%. We used this value to estimate the sizes of the aver-
age error bars presented in Figs. 2, 3, and 4. Moreover,
the setup dephases the transmitted photons, which re-
sults in the attenuation of the off-diagonal density matrix
terms by an additional factor of exp(−0.05tB). The setup
introduces polarization-dependent losses, which are de-
scribed by the ratio of the maximum achievable transmis-
sivity for H-polarised photons and the maximum trans-
missivity for V -polarised photons (no V polarisation fil-
tering) equal to T (H)/T (V ) = 96%. Finally, there are
some technological polarization-independent losses that
do not affect our results, leading to a single-loop trans-
missivity Ttech = 10%.
Temporal steerable weight The temporal steer-
able weight is a counterpart of the EPR steering
weight of Skrzypczyk et al. [50], where the assem-
blage {ρa|Ai(tA)}a,i is formed by the set of Alice’s mea-
surements and outcomes. The conditional probability
P (a|Ai) = tr[ρa|Ai(tA)] of Alice detecting the outcome
a while setting her apparatus to measure Ai can be cal-
culated directly from the assemblage. Bob at time tB
receives states ρˆa|Ai(tA) = ρa|Ai,tA (tA)/P (a|Ai,tA) after
they passed through a nonunitary channel. Thus, Bob’s
assemblage is {ρa|Ai(tB)}a,i ≡ {ρa|Ai}a,i, where the ex-
plicit form of ρ(t) is given in the main article. To obtain
this assemblage experimentally, Bob performs quantum
state tomography of the received qubit.
The unsteerable assemblages [50] can be created inde-
pendently of Alice’s observables, and can be expressed
as
ρa|Ai =
∑
γ
Dγ(a|Ai)ργ ∀a, i,
such that tr
∑
γ
ργ = 1, ργ ≥ 0 ∀γ,
(3)
where γ is a random variable, ργ are the states received
by Bob, and Dγ(a|Ai) are deterministic functions which
assign γ to a specific measurement Ai and its outcome
a [33, 39, 50].
The TS weight wt is the minimal amount of strictly
steerable resources needed to split any assemblage as
ρa|Ai = wtρ
S
a|Ai + (1− wt)ρUSa|Ai ∀a, i, (4)
where ρSa|Ai is a steerable assemblage and ρ
US
a|Ai is an
unsteerable assemblage. The smallest possible value of
0 ≤ wt ≤ 1 in Eq. (4) corresponds to the TS weight.
Thus, to find its value one needs to solve a convex opti-
mization problem. For small matrices, this can be done
efficiently using semi-definite programming.
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for demonstrating temporal steering. Here we use abbreviations: BS for beam splitter, PBS for
polarising BS, NDF for neutral density filter of tunable transmittance τ , BDn for beam dividers, PCn for the polarisation
controllers compensating polarisation rotation in the fibers, Qn for quarter-wave plates, Hn for half-wave plates, SPCM for
single-photon counting module, SM for the 15 m long single-mode optical fiber which forms a delay line of t = 80 ns (this is
larger than the 50 ns long dead time of the SPCM). Alice prepares the initial state by rotating a H-polarised photon with QA
and HA plates. Bob performs state analysis by setting his measurement basis with HB and QB, and detecting the incoming
photon in one of the orthogonal polarisation states.
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FIG. 2. Evolution of the TS parameters SN corresponding to the TS inequality [21, 33]: (a) S2 for BB84 (implemented with
the eigenvalues of the Pauli operators σ1 and σ2) and (b) S3 for B98. Here, γ is the damping constant and tB is the time of
the nonunitary evolution between the measurements of Alice and Bob leading to the state defined in Eq. (2). The values of S3
and S2 if the rotation R(4tB) is not implemented (noise for σ1 and σ2 measurements is uniform) are given by the dotted curves
S2 ≈ 2s2 exp(−γtB) and S3 ≈ s2[2 exp(−2γtB) + 1], respectively. This also corresponds to our experiment for 4tB = 2npi,
where n = 0, 1, 2. The shrinking factor s = 0.96 takes into account the initial impurity of the states sent by Alice. The solid
curves correspond to S2 and S3 calculated for the state given by Eq. (2) and accounting for the setup imperfections described
in the Methods.
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FIG. 3. Evolution of the temporal steerable weights wt,N as defined in Eq. (4). Here, tB is the nonunitary-evolution time,
γ is the damping constant, and N stands for the number of MUB, calculated for the theoretical (curves) and experimental
assemblages (data points) with a semi-definite program for (a) BB84 (N = 2) and (b) B98 (N = 3). The solid curves correspond
to wt,2 and wt,3 calculated for the state given by Eq. (2) and accounting for the setup imperfections described in the Methods.
The temporal steerable weights do not exhibit an oscillatory behaviour because these do not depend on the choice of Bob’s
measurement bases.
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FIG. 4. Evolution of the generalised Stokes parameters, i.e., the expected values of the Pauli operators Bn = σn (see Ref. [33])
for the six eigenstates |a,An〉 for n = 1, 2, 3 and a = ±1. Experimental data for the relevant states with a = +1 (a = −1) are
illustrated with triangles (squares). The time between Alice’s and Bob’s measurements tB is given in units of the inverse of the
relaxation constant γ. In our experiment γ = 2× 107 s−1. The solid (dashed) curves correspond to the expected values of the
Pauli operators calculated for the relevant a = +1 (a = −1) states defined in Eq. (2).
